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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF' UTAH
JAMES H. PO,VERS,
Plaintiff

~

Appellant,

)

vs.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF )'
UTAH & SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION,
Defendants ~ Respondents. ,

C ase N o.
10587

DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT SALT
LAKE CITY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

The respondent Salt Lake City Corporation respectfully petitions this court for rehearing in the above
entitled action and alleges that the court in its majority
opinion filed on May 10, 1967, erred on the following
points:
I. This court has usurped the function of the Utah

Industrial Commission and has substituted its judgment for that of the Commission contrary to law.
1
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2. The order of the Industrial Commission was
supported by competent evidence and should have been
sustained.

1

3. The court erred in holding that the decision of

the Industrial Commission was arbitrary and not based
upon the evidence.
4. This court has set a serious precedent with re-

spect to internal bodily failures asserted as the basis
for workmen's compensation benefits contrary to the
law of this state prior to this decision.

WHEREFORE, defendant - respondent Salt
Lake City Corporation, a self-insurer under the w·orkmen's Compensation Act of this state, prays that this
action be reheard by this Honorable Court, and that
the foregoing errors of this court be corrected in the
interest of law and justice.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
Salt Lake City Attorney
JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
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1

1

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are accurately set forth in
the majority and dissenting opinions of the court. Ref erence to such facts will be made in the following argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE
COURT IN THIS CASE HAS USURPED THE
FUNCTION OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION BY SUBSTITUTING ITS
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE COMMISSION CONTRARY TO LAW.
The majority opinion in this appeal, in accordance
with the contention of the plaintiff-appellant in its
brief on appeal, has held that the Industrial Commission applied the "unusual strain" test in this case contrary to previous decisions of this court and that the
court was only concerned with whether or not "an ordinary exertion as contrasted to an unusual exertion
caused the injury in question." The "injury in question"
constituted disability resulting from arteriosclerotic
heart disease which admittedly existed prior to the date
of the alleged industrial accident.
'Vhat the majority opinion of this court has failed
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to recognize is that the medical panel report of Doctors
Viko, Erschler and Crockett, upon which the Industrial
Commission based its findings and order in this case,
was entirely consistent with the foregoing principles.
Thus, in its original and second reports the medical
panel concluded that, even assuming that Mr. Powers
suffered an attack of angina pectoris which was precipitated by his occupational activities of responding
to a fire alarm on the night in question, it could not
find that such an attack would be sufficient to aggra·
vate his pre-existing coronary artery disease to the
point of disability six months later. The medical panel
concluded that his disability was the result of the natural
course of his pre-existing coronary artery disease. The
question before the Industrial Commission was whether
or not Mr. Powers' disability was the result of occu·
pational aggravation of his existing heart disease on
September 25, 1963, or the natural progress of the
disease. It was immaterial, so far as the medical panel's
opinion was concerned, whether the anginal attack
which the medical panel accepted as having occurred.
resulted from ordinary or unusual exertion-the medi·
cal panel was of the opinion that such an attack was
not sufficient to ag,qravatc pre-existing coronary arter,lj
ddsease to the point of total disability.

1

1

!
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1
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I

,
1

1

Admittedly the medical opinion of Doctor Null ·
was in conflict with that of the medical panel, but the i
resolution of such conflict is the exclusive province of
the Industrial Commission and not the Supreme Court. !
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, Section 35· ·
4
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1-85, Utah Code Annotated 1953, expressly provides

that the commission's findings on questions of fact shall
be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review. The Industrial Commission in this case held that
the occupational events of the day in question cti<l
not aggravate the pre-existing heart ailment of the
appellant. The ordinary nature of the appellant's
activities on the night in question were mentioned by
both the medical panel and the Industrial Commission
in evaluating the causal relationship between the episode on September 25, 1963, and the onset of disability
six months later. By its decision in the case, this court
has abandoned its pronouncement in Purity Biscuit
Company v. Industrial Commission, 115 U. 1, 201 P.2d
961, that in cases where disease or internal failure
causes, or is, the injury there must be a causal connection between the employment and the injury. In
effect, the bare majority of this court has changed the
statutory requirement that an employee's internal
failure must arise "in the course of his employment'; to
a mere finding that such occurred in the duration of
his employment. It was this very possibility to which
Justice
olfe directed his concurring opinion in the
Purity Biscuit Company case wherein he stated that
the problem of the Industrial Commission in those
cases "where the disability or death occurs by an internal
failure contemporaneous with exertion attendant upon
the work or soon thereafter, is to determine whether the
exertion was a causative factor of the death or injury
or merely coincidental with the employment." He then

'V"

5
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came to the very problem here involved when he statetl
at page 970 of 201 P.2d Reporter:
"Where the exertion is comparatively mild
and of a kind of work the employee has been doing and disability or death results, then it would
appear to me that the proof that it was a material contributory factor to death or disability
should be clear and convincing. The more mild
the exertion, the more likely that the internal
failure was merely coincidental."

It 1s submitted that on the basis of the time which

elapsed between the angina! attack in this case and the
resulting disability (six months), the admitted preexistence of a deteriorating heart and arterial disease,
the extensive family history of heart failure in the appellant's immediate family, and the admitted anxiety
of the appellant during the time in question over his
wife's health, together with the mild nature of his
occupational activities on the night of the alleged accident, the evidence sustained the Industrial Commission's findings and order that the appellant's internal
failure, if any, on the night of September 25, 1963,
was merely coincidental with his employment.
This court's majority opinion has clearly invaded
the statutory province of the Industrial Commission
and, in doing so, has necessarily classified as arbitrary
the dedicated actions of the members of that commission, as well as eminently respected medical authorities
in order to justify its interference in matters with which
it has no legal jurisdiction. The substitution of the
judgment of the members of this court for that of the
6
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Industrial Commission on such matters is nothing less
than judicial usurpation of power which is as unjustified in state appellate courts as it is in the federal
judiciary.
POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL C0~1\VAS SUl'PORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN SUSTAINED.
~IISSION

The petitioner incorporates herein the argument
set forth under Point I. In addition, it should be pointed
out that the majority opinion accepted Dr. Null' s testimony as competent upon the very same questions
which it claims are incompetently and arbitrarily
answered by the highly respected medical panel in this
case. If the opinion of Dr. Null, who never examined
the appellant until long after the claimed accident and
therefore based his conclusion upon the medical history
of the patient as did the medical panel, is considered
competent evidence by this court, then most certainly
the opinion of the medical panel upon the identical
questions is also competer:t evidence and the Industrial
Commission's order based upon such evidence should
be sustained. This court has long held that the findings
of the Industrial Commission on conflicting medical
testimony could not be disturbed on appeal even though
the Supreme Court might have come to a different conclusion. Campbell v. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Comprmy, 64 U. 430, 231 P. 620.
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POINT III
This court on many occasions has held that a finding
of arbitrariness on the part of the Industrial Commission cannot be made by the Supreme Court unless it
appears from the record that the Industrial Commis·
sion has disregarded uncontradicted evidence, substan·
tial in character. Batchelor v. Industrial Commission,
86 U. 261, 42 P.2d 996; Banks v. Industrial Commission, 74 U. 166, 278 P. 58; Harness v. Industrial Commission, 81 U. 276, 17 P.2d 277; Milkovich v. Industrial
CommisS'ion, 91 U. 498, 64 P.2d 1290; Norris v. Industrial Commission, 90 U. 256, 61 P.2d 413. Thus, in
the Milkovich case, the court stated as follows in headnote 3:
"Supreme Court will ordinarily reverse conclusion of Industrial Commission as arbitrary
only where evidence is uncontradicted, * * * ."
The importance of the Commission's disregarding uncontradicted evidence in order for the Supreme Court
to find that it acted arbitrary or capriciously is graph·
ically detailed in the following statement of the court
in the Norris case (page 415 of 61 P.2d Reporter):
"Where the matter presented on appeal is the
question of whether the commission should have
in law arrived at a conclusion of fact different
from that at which it did arrive from the evidence, a question of law is presented only when
it is claimed that the commission could only
arrive at one conclusion from the evidence, and
that it found contrarv to that inevitable con·
clusion. But in order to reverse the commission

8
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in this regard it must appear at least that (a)
the evidence is uncontradicted, and ( b) there is
nothing in the record which is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony and
( c) that the uncontradicted evidence is not
wholly that of interested witnesses or, if the
unmntradicted evidence is wholly or partly from
others than interested witnesses, that the record
shows no bias or prejudice on the part of such
other witnesses, and ( d) the uncontradicted
evidence is such as to carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable mind and sustain the burden of proof, and ( e) precludes any other explanation or hypothesis as being more or equally
as reasonable, and ( f) there is nothing in the
record which would indicate that the presence
of the witnesses gave the commission such an
advantage over the court in aid to its conclusions
that the conclusions should for that reason not
be disturbed.
c, If the commission should decide a,qainst the
uncontradicted evidence under those conditions,
its decision tvoidd as a matter of law be arbitrary
and capricious, which is another way of sayin.c;
that it would be unreasonable." (Emphasis added.)

In the Banks case the court had a factual situation
in many ways similar to this case with the exception
that the evidence supported a finding of overexertion
by the employee followed by his death eleven days later
from angina pectoris or coronary occlusion. Two doctors
\\'ere of the opinion that the decedent's condition was
brought about by the heavy lifting he had engaged
in on his work and two doctors were of the opinion that

9
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the alleged strain or overexertion was not connecteu
with and did not contribute to the employee's death. A
fifth doctor declined to say whether the overexertion
or strain was a contributory cause in the case. In sustaining the Industrial Commission's denial of compensation, this court held as follows:
"The evidence that the employee was subjected to a strain or overexertion was uncontradicted, but that it resulted in a physical injury
to the employee was positively contradicted by
the opinion evidence of two doctors, and also
rendered improbable by the testimony of a fel·
low workman who was present at the time and
observed the deceased employee, but saw or
heard nothing to indicate that he had been in·
jured. We cannot say upon this record that, in
denying the claim, the Industrial Commission
acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or without suf·
ficient cause rejected uncontradicted evidence."
Certainly, the facts in the instant case warrant affirm·
ance of the Commission's order and should not be found
to be arbitrary in view of the Banks case.
By reason of the foregoing authorities it is submitted that the majority opinion has erred in holding
the order of the Industrial Commission to be arbitrary
when based upon admitted contradictory medical evidence as to the causal connection between the appel·
lant's disability and the occupational events to which
he attributes his disability.

10
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POINT IV
THE COURT HAS SET A SERIOUS
PRECEDENT \VITH RESPECT TO INTER~AL .BODILY FAILURES ASSERTED AS
THE BASIS FOR \VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS CONTRARY TO THE LAVV
OF THIS STATE PRIOR TO THIS DECISION.
The majority opm10n m this case casts serious
doubt upon the legality or efficacy of a medical panel
study and report as required by Section 35-1-77, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Indeed this decision
which has found the Industral Commission's order
arbitrary when such order was based upon the medical
panel report, could be forcefully argued for the proposition that the Commission acts arbitrarily in any case
in which it adopts a medical panel report whose conclusions conflict with the medical evidence offered by
an applicant for workmen's compensation benefits.
Such a legal result is patently wrong and constitutes
further encroachment by this court upon the statutory
prerogatives of the commission. Furthermore, it is submitted that such a result is contrary to all the legal
precedents enumerated under Points I, II and III
of this brief and will establish a precedent contrary
to the statutory and decisional law of this state prior
to this case.

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
In order that this court may avoid the unjustifierl
substitution of its own judgment for that of the Jn.
dustrial Commission on matters which are exclusively
within the province of the latter, this petition for rehearing should be granted and the order of the Jn.
dustrial Commission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
Salt Lake City Attorney
JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
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